THE SHORT HISTORY OF HADEJIA PART 3

The reason for this behaviour was, according to
oral tradition, that Buhari was averse to the idea
of fighting his junior brother for the throne. It
could well be that he felt his brother was no
more than a pitiable pawn of the Sokoto power
brokers. When in the aftermath of the battle of
Takoko Ahmadu was pursued and executed by
Sarkin Arewa Tatagana, Buhari was disconsolate:
“why”, he lamented, “did you have to kill my
poor brother.”
The battle of Takoko was itself forced on Buhari.
A year after he was driven out of Hadejia, the
Sultan sent Dangaladiman Sokoto to the capital.
His mission was to continue where his brother,
the Waziri, has left off. At Hadejia the
Dangaladima and Ahmadu were joined by
contingents from Kano, Katagum, Misau and
Jama’are. A joint attack was then launched on
Buhari at his camp, leaving him no alternative
but to fight back. Indeed, Buhari used the
opportunity to drive the Caliphate allies beyond
Hadejia city, and re-enter the palace. In a rather
hollow gesture, the Sultan now appointed Tukur,
another junior brother of Buhari’s, as his own
“Emir” of Hadejia. Tukur died in 1904, having
lived quietly for the rest of his life in Kano and
Katagum emirates.
Gamon Kaffur Barely a year after Buhari re-
entered Hadejia, Sultan Aliyu organised perhaps
the most menacing expedition against him. This
time virtually all the major Sokoto emirates were
involved. Apart from Sokoto itself, there included
Zamfara, Zaria, Kano, Katagum, Bauchi, as well
as Gombe, Misau and Jama’are.
According to some estimates horses alone
numbered at least 20,000. The Kanawa
contingents were led by Galadiman Kano
Abdullahi. Overall command fell to the Sultan’s
strongman, the formidable Wazirin Sokoto,
though his was more or less a supervisory role
only. Sarkin Miga Umaru was supposed to show
the way because he was the one most familiar
with the approaches to Hadejia. For all the
difference that made, the expedition could as
well have been guided by a blind man………
To be fair, Sarkin Miga cannot be blamed if the
expedition chose to move in a formation that
had always been vulnerable to an ambush.
Because once the allied units converged on
southern Hadejia, they had formed in solid
phalanxes, moving forward in a slow, confident
procession towards the capital. Somebody
should have told them that that was the sort of
thing you don’t do, especially in an area with
which you are not thoroughly familiar. Certain
units of Federal troops were fond of this type of
advance during the Nigerian civil war, and were
made to pay dearly by relatively ill-equipped
Biafrans.
The allied expedition confident – indeed over-
confident – in its numbers was oblivious to any
imminent danger. They had anticipated that they
will not meet any real opposition till they reached
the Hadejia walls, and once there had no doubts
whatsoever that they could squash any
opposition Buhari could muster. How wrong they
were…………
Because, as it turned out, Buhari did not stay to
be surrounded in his capital, but intercepted the
expedition forces at Kaffur village, six miles from
Hadejia. The eventual victory of Buhari at this
decisive battle owes, more than any other thing
else, to the fact that he was the one who picked
the field of battle. And his choice of the Kaffur
terrain amply demonstrated his military genius.
Movie buffs are familiar with scenes in old
westerns, where a number of Indians have
suddenly appeared on a ridge dominating a plain
over which certain cowboys have pitched their
tents. To the helpless cowboys the Indians
always seemed to materialize from nowhere, and
their numbers likewise invariably appear more
than is actually the case.
At Kaffur Buhari had, very much like an Indian
War Chief, quietly slipped his men into position
along a high ridge overlooking a broad plain
containing the expedition forces. He then had his
maroka drum out his well-known arrival tune to
the “unorganised mass of soldiery” – according
to Victor Law – resting below. What ensued was
pandemonium. Barden Rinde Muhammadu vividly
described the resulting melee:
“On hearing the drum beat, Galadiman Kano’s
army began to flee. Instead of bridling their
horses’ fronts they bridled their tails. All was
confusion as they attempted to save their lives.
No one stood his ground.”
In the subsequent rout that followed the general
confusion, a number of prominent casualties
were recorded. A son of Sarkin Zaria and three of
Sarkin Kano were killed, as were seventeen sons
of various Kano sarakuna. The Sultan himself
lost a grandson. As for the Waziri, we was
reportedly seen riding at full rein and would later
surface at Shira town, some seventy miles from
Kaffur.